audio; backdated to the 20th

[candothat]

[The recording starts mid-conversation (caused, perhaps, by excited gesticulating). Chekov's voice is loud and clear; any number of other voices can be in the background, along with the occasional clink of glass on glass and the roar of laughter. The words of whoever he's talking to can't be made out.]

--method of teleportation that you are talking about does not lead to the destruction of the individual. I think that you misunderstand how the process works.

[A pause. More background noise.]

No, no no no. Our identity depends upon how the constituent molecules that we are made of are arranged, not upon which molecules have been arranged. There is no difference between one carbon atom and another, do you understand? And so if the position of everything that makes us up is copied perfectly and this information is transmitted and we are annihilated and reassembled, we will, in the end, be the same person as we were at the start.

[His conversational partner apparently has something to say to that.]

No one is killed. I cannot be more specific about the process, but I understand your concern about personal identity and the destruction of the individual being teleported.

[A much longer pause.]

Now you are making the assumption that there is something more than the physical arrangement of constituent particles that leads to this thing called the individual. Unless you are telling me that there is an immaterial soul to be concerned with, what is the concern? From the perspective of the individual being teleported, the process is nearly instantaneous and they experience no cessation of existence or consciousness. As I said, arrangement is what matters.

[Short pause.]

Of course duplication would be possible, that is why any technology capable of copying individuals down to the quantum level would necessitate a number of safety precautions. Responsible engineering can prevent paradoxes like the one you pose.

[Another long pause.]

No, I have not. What is the Ship of Theseus?


[OOC: Open to action at the Wolf's Den. Sorry for backdating, but yesterday's curse was perfect and I missed it and everything was sadness. That said, I don't think Chekov's probably the best of philosophers...]

Comments

[unflagging]

Yeah, but which one is his? One of the ships is made out of parts that were stolen from him and the other is the one that he rebuilt. So which is his, really?

[candothat]

The one that he is sailing on. The other is the ship that was stolen from Theseus in pieces.

[unflagging]

But that one that was stolen was his. Isn't something stolen something that doesn't belong to the person taking it?

If a whole thing is taken apart into its pieces and all those pieces replaced with identical pieces, is it the same thing as it was before or does it only appear to be the same thing? Is it real or is it a copy?

Or, as an acquaintance of mine was fond of saying: is it real or is it Memorex?

[candothat]

In this case, I believe that the thief earned his ownership of these pieces.

But no, I think it is the same as it is with ships at home. Once one is decommissioned, parts of it may be used on a newer model, and that model may be given the name of the original ship, but it is never the same as the original ship. It is always designated with a letter. Perhaps the thief has the original and Theseus has the A model.

Not that it matters. What is Memorex? Slang?

[unflagging]

I think you're thinking of this in legal terms. Bless you, scientific types. I wonder if you've reached the limits of your understanding. But we will press on.

So, okay, let's go back to the start. Instead of a ship, you've got a person. So now you take that person apart, down to the subatomic level, and you use whatever sort of technology necessary to induce spooky action at a distance, or something like it, so that the person's subatomic particles are flipped, switched, changed, or otherwise moved from one place to another. Thereafter, those particles are reassembled to form that person again. But is it that person? On what does a person's "real" existence depend? Does it matter that this person is not made of the same particles as before? Will that affect memory and mind? Is this person truly the same person as before? Yes, the particles are identical, but does that affect the way in which one thinks of that person and does that affect the way in which that person thinks of the world (or universe, for let it stand for both)?

Remember, Theseus's ship is almost in two places at once without being anywhere at all. Theseus has his repaired and rebuilt ship which he thinks of as his and the thief has the reassembled old parts of Theseus's ship in a new place. Which one is, for lack of a better word, the "real" ship?

What, Memorex? It's magnetic recording tape. Here, hang on. They guy I knew always got the catch phrase wrong, so go figure, but I found something on CityTube that might help:

"Memorex Cassette Tapes" [01] - TV commercial (1981)

[candothat]

I have reached no such limits.

Of course it is still that person. Memory, mind, and personal identity are unaffected by the process, and so there is no reason to think that the reassembled person is not the "real" person.

I think that too much emphasis is being placed on this word, "real." What is is real, correct? Theseus has a rebuilt ship, the thief has a ship built of the pieces of what was Theseus' ship. Either way, what was no longer is.

[Wow, that... is dated technology.]

That seems a waste of glasses.

[unflagging]

You sure about that, kid?

That's the question: what is real? What is the true thing?

[It can be, depending on when one's looking at it.]

Isn't it? I feel bad for whoever has to clean up all that broken glass.

[candothat]

Relatively sure.

There is no substance to this question. Both ships are real.

[unflagging]

I'm not denying that both ships exist. Both ships exist. It's just a matter of thinking about what it means.

[candothat]

It means that, if you are clever enough to not allow a thief to take apart and steal your entire boat, you will not be faced with a paradox.

[unflagging]

A pragmatic solution! Well done!

[candothat]

I think you are patronizing me.

[unflagging]

Nah, I have...let's say a fair amount of respect for good ol' pragmatism. One of my oldest acquaintances is very much inclined in that direction.

What do you think about M-theory?

[candothat]

I think that M-theory was an elegant product of its time.

[DON'T GO THERE. Janeway will eat him if he talks about future science too much!]

[unflagging]

Nice answer.

[Go there? He lives there.]

[candothat]

What do you think of it?

[unflagging]

It's okay. But it's so limited and limiting. I like the multiverse theory, and maybe the many-worlds interpretation, better. Multiverse more than many-worlds, but they're kind of cousins when you look at them in the right way. I'll go with multiverse, I think. I like it better.

The greatest mystery the universe offers is not life but size.

[candothat]

The multiverse theory does have much to recommend it.

[And it has been proven true by Chekov's time, so. The MWI is still debatable.]

Then have you solved the mystery of life, or are you less interested in it than in size?

[unflagging]

Doesn't it, though? Especially here.

Oh, I think I'm just less interested in it than size right now.

[candothat]

Do you always think about the mysteries of the universe?

[Because if so, that's neat.]

[unflagging]

When I have time, sure. I can't think of much that's better to think about.

[candothat]

That I agree with.